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Both migration and climate change are controversial topics in the 21st century. Migration is 
increasingly monitored due to increasing fears of national security threats brought by migrants 
themselves, while there is a lack of international diplomatic action concerning climate change and 
its effects. Thus, the recent discourse concerning ‘climate change refugees,’ or those fleeing their 
homes because of climate change, poses a challenge when regarded within the current international 
migration framework. However, much of the language used in the discourse is broad, abstract, 
simplistic and alarmist. Given this, the discourse impairs understanding of what is happening in 
diverse areas of the world because of climate change. Thus, this thesis seeks to investigate the 
effects, impacts and relevance of this international narrative and discourse on ‘climate change 
refugees’ in South Asia. Overall, the thesis argues that the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse 
distorts the reality of climate change migration in the South Asian region and offers few practical 
solutions for those displaced by environmental factors. The discourse simplifies migration and 
fails to take into account the varied, complex conditions in which migration occurs. These findings 
have significant international policy implications as intergovernmental organizations and 
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i.1 Global Migration Patterns and Climate Change 
 In 2015, the number of global international migrants, those living for one year or longer 
outside their country of birth, was 3.3% of the world population, or around 244 million 
individuals (United Nations General Assembly 2016). With increased levels of globalization, 
there are increased international causes for and impacts of migration. One such influence is that 
of climate change. While environmental migration, where individuals migrate due to natural 
disaster, is a historically common practice, migration due to anthropogenic climate change, or the 
changing of global climate patterns due to human activity, is unique to our century. In 2013, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a report in which it had concluded 
with 95% certainty that recent shifts in climate and general global warming patterns are 
attributed to human activity, specifically stemming from greenhouse gas emission through the 
burning of fossil fuels for energy (Climate & Development Knowledge Network 2014). In 
subsequent reports, the IPCC cites the role of human activity on changing climate patterns and 
indicates that the likelihood of extreme climate events continues to increase as carbon dioxide 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) levels in the atmosphere rise (Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report 
IPCC 2014). Overall, the changes brought by anthropogenic climate change have a wide range of 
effects on the earth’s environmental and climate system.  
Due to population growth and industrialization, atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions 
have increased tremendously the 1800s; within the last 50 years alone, the IPCC cites that CO2 
levels have increased by approximately by 100 parts per million (ppm) to 400 ppm, the highest 
in the past 400,000 years (Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report IPCC 2014). Climate change 
directly affects ecosystems, biodiversity and large environmental orders, including regional 
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temperature variations, sea-level rise and water systems. Since the 1880s, global average 
temperature rose by 0.8 ºC, with most warming occurring since 1975, while global mean seal 
level rose by 0.19 m from 1901 to 2010 (Climate & Development Knowledge Network 2014). 
Over 70% of natural disasters are the result of climate change and it is expected that this number 
will only increase (Pourhashemi et al. 2012). These current impacts and future predictions 
emphasize the severity of future climate change; one in which catastrophic climate disasters may 
be commonplace and severely impact social order, security and migration. Overall, these 
environmental changes directly affect the ability of humans and other living creatures to survive 
in certain places; thus, climate change may serve as a new variable in the commonly cited push-
and-pull factors triggering human migration and may affect global migration patterns. 
 Both migration and climate change are controversial political topics in the 21st century. 
Migration is increasingly monitored and restricted due to increasing fears of national security 
threats brought by migrants themselves, while there is a lack of unified, international diplomatic 
action concerning climate change and its effects. Thus, the recent discourse concerning ‘climate 
change refugees,’ or those fleeing their homes because of climate change effects, complicates the 
already established international migration framework. The Norwegian Refugee Council 
announced in 2008 that 20 million people migrated that year due to natural disasters resulting 
from climate change, with most of the migrants being from developing countries (Pourhashemi 
et al. 2012). Currently, there is a large volume of academic literature and international media 
concerning ‘climate change refugees.’ However, climate and migration scholars argue that much 
of the language used in the discourse is broad, abstract, simplistic and alarmist. It becomes 
difficult to separate fact from fiction and truly understand what is happening in diverse areas of 
the world because of climate change. Thus, this thesis seeks to investigate the effects, impacts 
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and relevance of this international narrative and discourse on ‘climate change refugees’ in the 
South Asian region.  
i.2 Why South Asia?  
 This thesis will focus on the South Asian region in particular. South Asia is comprised of 
8 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka (Thapa 2016).1 South Asia is a culturally, ethnically and historically diverse area that is at 
the center of major international political, economic and social debates. Currently, South Asia is 
a hotbed for political conflict and strife; Naxalite-Maoist clashes between insurgent and 
government groups in India, the continuing struggle against warlords and Taliban in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, as well as continued clashes of Indian and Pakistani troops over the Kashmir issue 
have created a politically tense environment, which has significant effects on regional security 
and cooperation (World Politics Review 2014) (Riedel 2017). These conditions complicate 
discussion about the national and regional priority of the climate change issue.  
South Asia has received international attention for being an extremely climate vulnerable 
region due to extremely high population density, high density of poverty (~700 million living on 
less than $1.25 per day) and lack of resources for climate adaptation (equitybd 2010). India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan were within the top twenty countries with most displacements from 
climate change-induced natural disasters in 2008 with 6.5 million displaced in India and 89,200 
in Pakistan (Pourhashemi et al. 2012). Each country faces unique challenges; in 2016, the city of 
New Delhi, one of the largest in the region, was characterized as the most polluted in the world, 
while the country of Maldives is continually threatened with extreme sea-level rise that will 
                                                            
1 As defined by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an economic 
forum established in 1985.  
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endanger the island nation (Griffiths 2016). An increase in extreme weather events in Pakistan, 
India, and Nepal threaten the livability of many areas while extreme deforestation in Afghanistan 
plays a significant role in national security and development. Finally, Bangladesh is threatened 
by all of the above, creating complex scenarios for those wishing to leave for climate reasons. 
Overall, climate change effects in the ecologically diverse South Asian region are manifold and 
complex, which are the reasons I have decided to focus my research on this area.  
The aspects of regional migration and internal displacement for climate change reasons is 
another area of interest. From visiting South Asia in the past, I have seen that the level of internal 
displacement and environmental degradation has markedly increased. Revi cites that city centers 
have continued growing due to in-migration from other areas and climate change effects have 
become more and more commonplace (Revi 2008). In this thesis, I will demonstrate that creating 
regionally-tailored frameworks to responsibly and adequately acknowledge and protect such 
climate change migrants is an important component for development in the region.  
 Finally, South Asia is already one of regions of the world with high levels of human 
mobility (Ghosh 2004). The region is characterized by porous state borders as well as high levels 
of movement to the West, Middle East or Southeast Asia for asylum, education or work. South 
Asia also produces and hosts a significant number of refugees. Afghanistan is one of the three 
largest refugee-producing nations in the world (produced 2.7 million refugees in 2015), while 
Pakistan hosts the second largest number of refugees in the world (1.6 million refugees received 
mostly from Afghanistan in 2015) (UNHCR 1999). India also hosts a significant number of 
refugees from Tibet, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Iran and Iraq. Despite the large number of refugees, 
all South Asian countries, excluding Afghanistan, have not ratified important international 
conventions regarding forced migration and refugees (Office of the United Nations High 
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Commisioner For Refugees 2015). Since South Asian countries have not taken the first steps to 
address forced migration and its causes through ratifying these conventions, as climate change 
effects on migration patterns become more distinctive, there is an opportunity for new models 
and conversations to arise around forced displacement and such ‘climate change refugees’ in the 
South Asian context.  
i.4 Research Question, Methodology and Arguments 
  This thesis will investigate the recent discourses on ‘climate change refugees’ and how 
they have been defended and adopted in internationally as well as within South Asia. A major 
component of this thesis will be in investigating the validity and applicability of such discourses 
in South Asia. It will specifically examine how ‘climate change refugee’ discourses are 
perceived as relevant and alarmist regarding migration in South Asia. To do so, the thesis will 
combine academic theoretical analyses, data from reports by international agencies and 
organizations, as well as news media and print articles to highlight the different use of narrative 
and representation of environmental migrants or ‘climate change refugees.’ Throughout the 5 
chapters, it will analyze current international and regional laws and policies and how this has 
affected perceptions of and attitudes toward both climate change and migration.  
 Overall, the thesis will answer the research question, how has the ‘climate change 
refugee’ discourse been articulated, defended, and adopted internationally and within South Asia 
and how appropriate are the solutions and recommendations offered by such a discourse? I argue 
that the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse offers a limited perspective of the climate migration 
problem and relies on alarmist narratives which ultimately disenfranchise migrants themselves. 
Thus, the solutions offered by such a discourse are limited in scope and impractical given the 
complexity behind climate-induced migration. The first chapter of the thesis will outline the 
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changing refugee discourse and introduce the concept of ‘climate change refugee’ in the broader 
climate migration and refugee agenda. It will also broadly outline how this discourse has been 
imagined under humanitarian and human rights perspectives and adopted and enacted in 
international and regional spheres using theoretical arguments by academics and the practical 
applications of inter-governmental organizations including the United Nations (UN) and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). The second chapter will focus on the status of 
migration in South Asia, offering insights into the history of migration and current challenges 
concerning climate change and development. Overall, this chapter will serve to demonstrate the 
complexity of climate change migration in the region using theories of how migration decisions 
occur as well as concrete data of climate change migration patterns around the region. The third 
chapter will demonstrate how the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse is understood and projected 
by both media and academic journal sources to highlight the complexity in perspective in the 
region regarding climate change migration. The fourth chapter will offer critiques of the ‘climate 
change refugee’ narrative in the South Asian context to highlight gaps and inconsistencies, 
especially regarding the link between climate change and development, that must be addressed. 
Finally, the fifth chapter will summarize major points of the thesis as well as highlight future 
directions and recommendations for South Asia in protecting those who move for environmental 
reasons and how the climate vulnerable region can develop an effective framework for 
addressing such migration. 
The thesis will have two conclusions. The first being, that even though there is 
considerable literature surrounding ‘climate change refugees,’ there has been little diplomatic 
action in international spheres and even less in climate vulnerable region of South Asia due to 
lack of international engagement with and responsibility for climate change effects and national 
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agendas that prioritize economic and industrial development. While the challenges and dangers 
climate change presents to the South Asian region are well-defined and researched, there is a 
lack of an international and regional response to the issue. This presents a multitude of problems 
regarding the protection of various migrant groups under international human rights and 
humanitarian conventions and must be addressed as soon as possible through effective, practical 
and appropriate diplomatic action.  
 The second conclusion is that while climate change is a significant factor in migration 
decisions for many groups, the solution offered by the international discourse of ‘climate change 
refugees’ and its media representation can be perceived as alarmist, isolating, and not wholly 
representative of migration in the South Asian region. Theories around migration demonstrate 
that pin-pointing an individual’s choice to move solely on climate change or environment is 
extremely difficult and does not consider other factors such as socio-economic status and cultural 
or political context. While migration is an effective adaptation strategy for climate change 
effects, it should not be thought of as the primary or only solution. In addition to creating 
international and regional infrastructures to facilitate climate change migration, climate change 
migration discourses should also include efforts to implement effective adaptation and mitigation 
strategies in this climate vulnerable region. Using this argumentation, the thesis will conclude 
that the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse needs to be reframed to create more positive and 
effective solutions for the problem of climate change-induced displacement.  
 Overall, this thesis will broadly survey how attitudes to both climate change and 
migration shape international diplomacy and discourse. While it will demonstrate that migration 
due to environmental disaster/degradation is not new, in its conclusion, it will emphasize that 
discourse surrounding migration must be re-considered and re-framed in a more positive way. 
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While the feasibility of this is debatable, it is an attempt to address the negativity and hostility 
with which many migrants, regardless of their official status, are faced. Finally, this thesis will 
also demonstrate the extreme need for climate change to be both recognized as an international 
issue and implemented in international, regional and national institutions. The conflicting 
agendas concerning climate change pose an enormous problem in addressing the diverse issues 




















Chapter 1 – The 21st Century Migrant: Changing Refugee Discourses 
1.1 Chapter Objectives 
In this chapter, I will introduce the international discourse around ‘climate change 
refugees,’ including commonly cited human rights and humanitarian defenses for protecting such 
migrants. Currently, the discourse surrounding this migrant group is layered with different 
perceptions, agendas and levels of political engagement. There is no single unified definition of a 
‘climate change refugee,’ which poses significant challenges in the creation of a framework to 
protect such migrants. Additionally, I will also discuss common critiques of the ‘climate change 
refugee’ discourse and how international scholars envision institutions and frameworks set up for 
the protection of such migrants. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of how such 
academic ideas have been instituted in international and regional settings. Overall, this chapter 
will provide an overview of the discourse on ‘climate change refugees’ that is the main subject of 
this thesis.  
1.2 The ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Discourse: A Global Responsibility  
Anthropogenic climate change is a global phenomenon that has been increasingly 
investigated for its widespread impacts on human life, politics, and economy. Climate change 
has had significant impacts on global migration patterns as it contributes to and exacerbates 
many of the push-or-pull factors regarding movement, which has severe implications for global 
security (Munslow and Dempsey 2010). Sea-level rise, as well as increased severity and 
frequency of extreme weather events like droughts, floods are some of the effects of climate 
change (Brown 2015). These effects can compromise food and water security and change 
agricultural mechanisms in communities, translating into poverty and domestic or international 
relocation to urban areas. This internal and international displacement may affect political 
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networks and agendas and contribute to the rise in complex humanitarian emergencies (Munslow 
and Dempsey 2010). For example, many academics, although unremarked upon in the 
mainstream press, attribute the recent Syrian refugee crisis in Europe on a civil war heavily 
influenced by drought and internal displacement caused by climate change (Lieberman 2016).  
With the continued emission of greenhouse gases and lack of international consensus on 
how to approach and handle climate change on a global scale, the problem of climate change 
induced displacement will only continue and worsen. By 2050, it has been estimated globally 
that between 250 million and 1 billion people will be displaced for environmental reasons 
(Tacoli 2009). The low-estimate of the number of ‘climate change refugees’ is 5 times the 
number the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees currently handles in total. 
However, experts on climate change, like Sir Nicholas Stern, consider these under-estimates at 
best (Albrecht and Plewa 2015). 
Currently, the international community lacks both a universally accepted definition of 
‘climate change refugee’ and the international policies necessary to protect these migrants. The 
former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has conceded the 
international community’s failure to address climate change in an effective manner. The 
UNHCHR has asserted that this failure results from the relatively weak political and cooperative 
will among states to reduce the negative impact of climate change and recognize migration 
stimulated by environmental factors as valid (UNHCR 2011). The dichotomy between the reality 
of climate change induced migration and the lack of substantial international agency to protect 
these individuals needs to be addressed on a global scale.  
To begin, currently, there are many perspectives on what an environmental migrant is and 
how it is defined; this terminology ranges from “environmentally induced migrant,” to 
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“environmental refugee” to the more recent “climate change refugee” (Biermann and Boas 
2010). Each definition carries with it a specific connotation, and there is no universally 
established categorization of such people who leave their homelands because of human-induced 
environmental degradation (Brown 2015). Thus, the lack of consensus complicates defining 
‘climate change refugee’ under this discourse and the context to which it fits within this thesis. 
Therefore, in this thesis, ‘climate change refugee’ will refer to an individual forced to flee his or 
her home and relocate permanently to a new country as a result of sudden or gradual 
environmental disruptions resulting from anthropogenic or human-induced climate change that 
has made their homeland uninhabitable (Albrecht and Plewa 2015). This definition does not 
differentiate between forced or voluntary or internal or external migration given the moral, 
ethical and human rights framework discussed later in the chapter. This definition generally does 
not discriminate based on type or cause of migration, but emphasizes adverse effects of climate 
change on livelihood, which results in a humanitarian imperative, albeit debated, to act and 
protect those affected. Finally, in order to distinguish between anthropogenic changes in the 
global ecosystem and other environmental disasters, in this definition, relevant climate change 
events will only include scientifically proven sea-level rise and increased severity and frequency 
of extreme weather events like floods, droughts, and storms (Albrecht and Plewa 2015).  
1.21 Humanitarian Defense for Climate Change Refugees  
Munslow and O’Dempsey argue that the moral and ethical framework for international 
organizations to add ‘climate change refugees’ to the global regime lies within the foundations of 
humanitarianism (2010). Humanitarianism is a global concept that has roots in many world 
religions and emphasizes the innate obligation to alleviate suffering and its causes through many 
forms of aid and assistance (Munslow and Dempsey 2010). Generally, the humanitarianism 
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central to our modern world is based on notions of goodwill and morality and emphasizes 
helping those in need. As the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio 
Guterres stated, humanitarian activity has the “goal of enabling people to live peaceful, 
productive and prosperous lives” (UNHCR 2011, 1). However, given the goals of 
humanitarianism, academics and scholars continue to debate on the ideal breadth and scope of 
humanitarian action.  
Climate change has the potential to severely degrade the environment to a point of 
inhabitability in many regions of the world; this level of suffering and displacement warrants, 
yet, does not receive adequate humanitarian action. The 200,000 Bangladeshis who become 
homeless every year due to river erosion are in a similar situation as the many that are trapped in 
sinking island states in the Pacific, specifically Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru. These individuals 
cannot appeal to international organizations for refugee status or resettlement (Lieberman 2016). 
Those who decide to stay will be plagued by harsh storms, inaccessibility to basic resources like 
food and water, and possibly death (Win 2012). Significant portions of the populations of other 
countries, like Pakistan and India, are in a precarious situation, caused by sea-level rise, 
desertification and other climate change related effects that not only pose a direct threat to life, 
but also threaten to undermine and ruin traditional agricultural systems, resulting in greater levels 
of food and water insecurity (Warner et al. 2010). Generally, these individuals will physically 
suffer if they remain in these environmentally-compromised regions, prompting migration and 
greater flows of climate change refugees. Those individuals who have physically and mentally 
suffered from man-made environmental change and denied the ability live in their cultural and 
historical homelands should be recognized and aided by such organizations given the 
moral/ethical framework from which humanitarianism stems. 
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In addition to emphasizing the severe mortality caused by flooding, droughts and sea-
level rise, The United States Pentagon has also demonstrated that climate change related effects 
like drought have the possibility to act as ‘threat multipliers’ (Baker 2015). Climate change 
related events will exacerbate existing social, ethnic and political tensions, which may contribute 
to or even instigate armed conflict and forms of persecution as fights over scarce resources 
appear (Munslow and Dempsey 2010). All of these conflicts may add to traditional internal or 
transboundary refugee flows. Thus, the potential suffering faced by many of these climate 
affected individual’s commands humanitarian action in the purest moral and ethical sense.  
As humanitarians have an obligation to alleviate suffering, they should and they do work to 
provide aid to such populations.  
 However, the aid they do give is not consistent across types of migrants. For example, 
following the 2001 floods of the Zambezi River in central Mozambique, many international 
humanitarian organizations sent resources and assistance to  populations forced to move from 
these low lying river areas to government-established resettlement locations (Warner et al. 2010). 
While these internally displaced people (IDPs) are domestically and internationally protected 
under government and international humanitarian law, if they had crossed international borders 
in an effort to escape a severe environmental threat, there would be few legal international 
mechanisms offering adequate recognition and protections (Carminati 2013). Tuvaluan migrants 
who fled to Australia and New Zealand were forcibly deported back to Tuvalu even though they 
were fleeing similar environmental threats of sea-level rise and food/water insecurity (Duong 
2010). Unlike those from Mozambique, their entire island was threatened by this environmental 
degradation, forcing them to cross international borders. This protection gap by international 
inter-governmental aid organizations based on the border-crossing status of ‘climate change 
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induced migrants,’ is confounding. Both migrants from Mozambique and Tuvalu will suffer if 
they stay in the regions from which they came, and are victims of a global man-made 
phenomenon, climate change (Albrecht and Plewa 2015). Thus, both should receive the same 
level of international attention and safety especially since humanitarianism is categorized as a 
philosophy that should benefit all people, regardless of political impartiality (Walker 2010).  
 The inconsistencies in the current treatment of those affected by environmental 
degradation demonstrates that the humanitarian moral imperative must go beyond simply 
providing aid to affected populations to legally allowing them the ability to relocate across 
international borders if necessary. Climate change is scientifically considered permanent; 
mitigation and adaptation strategies may help alleviate the symptoms, but will never reverse the 
effects (Duong 2010). Therefore, while aid and assistance may help populations survive for a 
short period of time, it does not erase the future certainty that these people may have to relocate, 
whether domestic or internationally. This uncertainty brings about another moral and ethical 
perspective to the necessity of recognizing climate change refugees in a global sense; while some 
governments may have the funds and resources to mitigate or adapt to climate change, others are 
not afforded this privilege (Biermann and Boas 2010). Many governments may not have the 
money to invest in adaptation or mitigation strategies, and are unable to protect their citizens 
from the negative effects of climate change. Thus, this discourse emphasizes that international 
mechanisms must be set into place to confer some level of protection to these migrants.  
 Another facet of the moral and ethical imperative is that many of the people most 
affected by and the least capable to adapt to climate change have contributed the least to this 
global phenomenon (Biermann and Boas 2010). The common theme established at the Rio 
Declaration on the Environment and Development that ‘the polluter should bear the cost of the 
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pollution’ demonstrates that developed countries and their governments, as well as humanitarian 
organizations which have a global responsibility to protect, have an obligation to help those 
negatively and severely impacted by a phenomenon to which they contributed (Biermann and 
Boas 2010). Populations in low-income countries affected by environmental degradation are 
increasingly vulnerable to climate change related disaster that may take their lives, or force them 
to migrate. While funds and resources should be invested at a state level in adaptation and 
mitigation strategies in at-risk countries, the international humanitarian community must 
recognize the logistical impossibility of controlling climate change in many affected regions. 
Migration might just be the ultimate adaptation strategy for many affected populations due to the 
lack of money and adequate resources in these low-income areas (Gemenne 2015). The 
humanitarian sphere has a duty to facilitate movement to save lives, and therefore must 
recognize the legality of climate change migrants.  
However, scholars debate that, while there is moral imperative to help those who suffer, 
it may be too extreme to include ‘climate change refugees’ in the moral and ethical 
responsibilities of humanitarianism (Fernández 2015). For example, those who suffer from 
extreme poverty are not included in the international refugee frameworks based on humanitarian 
ideals.  However, while this claim has some validity, the global causes of climate-change 
migration that lie with the actions of countries that did and continue to emit high levels of 
greenhouse gases complicates this assertion. Climate change induced effects, like sea-level rise 
and increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events, have been scientifically shown 
to be man-made and preventable, and caused by the actions of the international community 
(Warner et al. 2010). To conclude, recognizing and protecting climate change migrants is not just 
to alleviate suffering, but also to demonstrate a global responsibility and accountability to those 
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affected by climate change. While it may be difficult to establish a universal definition and 
framework to offer protection to these uprooted populations, under this international 
humanitarian perspective, it is morally and ethically unjust to ignore the effects of climate 
change and continue to allow these protection gaps to exist. 
Additionally, there is a common rhetoric that emphasizes since climate change is gradual 
in nature and often causes slow-onset disasters, governments and populations have the ability to 
preemptively make migratory and resettlement decisions (Brown 2015). In a sense, these 
scholars distinguish between voluntary and forced migration; if people leave before the crisis 
hits, international  humanitarian communities, like the UN, do not have a moral or ethical 
imperative to recognize and protect them (Gemenne 2015). However, this argument is morally 
dubious as even though migration may seem voluntary, the fact remains that these individuals 
are being unjustly displaced, most likely permanently, by a human-caused change that 
disproportionately impacts them (Gemenne 2015). Scholar James Hathaway emphasizes the need 
to acknowledge the social disenfranchisement that impacts both those who voluntarily migrate 
and those who are forced (Hathaway 2007). In this sense, the distinction between forced and 
voluntary migration is blurred. As so, climate change at its core is rooted in inequalities and 
inequities between the rich and poor. Developed countries have contributed the most to the 
phenomena and remain the least affected due to the ability to implement adaptation and 
mitigation strategies, while developing countries bear the brunt of climate change affects and 
have little developed infrastructure to deal with the threat. Since primary contributors to climate 
change are the least affected, they are more likely to reject the urgency of climate change and be 
morally distanced from helping those affected (Duong 2010). However, this does not diminish 
the reality of the climate change threat, and not only reasserts the global inequality faced by 
17 
 
climate change victims, but also emphasizes the moral necessity to globally recognize and 
protect climate change migrants.     
1.22 Human Rights Defense of Climate Change Refugees   
The second major framework for discussing the obligation of the humanitarian 
community to climate change refugees is that of human rights. In recent years, humanitarian 
organizations have adopted a human rights agenda in their mission to alleviate suffering; that is, 
violations of human rights command humanitarian action (Munslow and Dempsey 2010). While 
migrants forced to move due to climate change impacts can appeal to human rights law for legal 
recognition and protection, no true frameworks have been developed or used in current times on 
a global scale (Duong 2010). Those affected most by climate change are more likely to live in 
low-income countries with few mitigation/adaptation strategies and belong to groups whose 
rights protections are already at-risk (Albrecht and Plewa 2015). Therefore, since nations that 
continue to contribute through large levels of greenhouse gas emissions to climate change do 
infringe on the basic rights outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
those affected need to reassert these rights and call for accountability and protection on the part 
of responsible nations and humanitarian organizations, whose duty lies to aid global sufferers 
(Albrecht and Plewa 2015).   
Before discussing the rights-based defense of ‘climate change refugees,’ a discussion of 
the fundamental conceptualization and hierarchy of human rights is required. Rights are often 
treated as both standardized and absolute; however, given different contexts, this may not always 
be the case. While rights can command action and positive duties (positive rights), they may also 
have to be claimed and require abstaining from action or inaction (negative rights).  Hugh 
Breakey acknowledges that creating any rights-based positive duty agenda may in fact 
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compromise the fundamental nature of rights themselves (Breakey 2015). Thus, the language 
used around rights’ adoption and defense adds complexity to the ‘climate change refugee’ 
discourse use of a human rights-based agenda. Additionally, in the 1970s, Karel Vasak 
introduced the concept of ‘generation of rights,’ in which the first generation (blue) corresponds 
to civil and political rights, the second to economic and cultural rights, and the third to 
developmental and ecological rights. While the first generation, at its core, corresponds to 
fundamental rights to life, the second and third generation become more abstracted, and 
academics like Koopman and Vorster demonstrate that in certain contexts, such rights may not 
be able to be either fulfilled or defended (Koopman 2012) (Vorster 2004). Thus, Vorster argues 
that the second-generation rights may be limited in extreme situations where states or institutions 
do not have the economic capacity to defend them (Vorster 2004). Thus, the complexity of the 
human rights argument plays an important role in finding consensus in and validating the rights-
based defense of ‘climate change refugees.’   
Concerning climate migration, the ‘climate change refugee discourse’ demonstrates that 
many individual rights are at risk of being violated in regards to climate change. These include 
the right to life, the right to health, the right to food and water, the right to property and the right 
to self-determination and cultural expression (Duong 2010). The first basic human right which is 
violated by climate change is the right to life; intense storms, droughts and floods may and have 
killed many individuals. Since climate change, a human created occurrence, threatens the 
existence of many, it is valid for those affected to appeal to international organizations for the 
protection of this right. The right to food and water is also directly violated by climate change. 
Climate change can directly threaten access to clean water as well as agriculture. Subtler are the 
right to health, self-determination and cultural expression. Given that the UDHR asserts that all 
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individuals deserve a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of oneself, 
climate change infringes on this right of many. Climate change will undoubtedly negatively 
affect the livelihoods and quality of life of thousands (Duong 2010). Increasing water tables will 
make low-lying areas uninhabitable and increased flooding has had severe impacts on 
infrastructure. The violation to the right to self-determination and cultural expression is based in 
the idea that the existence and culture of many are intimately linked to the environment (Duong 
2010). Pacific Islands and low-lying regions of countries like Bangladesh and India may be lost 
entirely; this may signal the loss of history, culture and traditional way of life (Win 2012). 
Moreover, the physical loss of a nation may culminate in loss of sovereignty and statelessness, as 
well as loss of right to property. Due to climate change, many will lose not just historically and 
culturally significant edifices, but also their homes and community buildings (Duong 2010). 
Climate change impacts the ability of many to express themselves and their culture, and the 
ability of nations to express their sovereignty. Given this, international mechanisms must be put 
into place protect those refugees who migrate to adapt to the human rights violations created by 
climate change.  
While many may concede that the basic rights of those displaced are violated by climate 
change, others argue that, since most climate change migration occurs domestically, it can be 
assumed that rights’ protections lie with the government involved, releasing humanitarian 
organizations from a human rights obligation to these migrants (Brown 2015). However, this 
perspective is inadequate in many ways. It assumes that these governments are able and willing 
to protect these rights of their citizens. As discussed above, due to limited funds, many nations 
may simply not be able to afford mitigation and adaptation strategies to protect its citizens from 
right violations caused by climate change. Additionally, given the situation in places like Tuvalu, 
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even if such strategies were put in place, the government could still not and should not protect 
these rights singlehandedly (Duong 2010). Since the causes of climate change, in many cases, lie 
beyond borders, global initiatives should be adopted to proactively protect the rights of people 
affected by climate change. Climate change is a global phenomenon, all nations of the world 
have contributed (Duong 2010). Therefore, even if displacement is internal, all emitting nations 
have contributed to the human rights violations that caused it. This discourse reasserts the need 
for a global humanitarian mechanism to support and aid climate change refugees.  
1.3 International Defense and Adoption 
1.31 United Nations (UN) 
Despite the strong moral, ethical and human rights imperatives highlighted above to 
recognize and protect climate change refugees, there is still relatively little legal international 
mechanisms of doing so. Perhaps the most influential refugee organization, the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) set a human rights standard for international refugee 
law when it ratified its first multilateral treaty, the Convention Relating the Status of Refugees, 
on July 28, 1951 by 26 countries (Sharma 2015). However, climate change refugees are not 
recognized under this Convention, which is critiqued as only recognizing a limited, political-
persecution based and Euro-centric approach to defining ‘refugee’ (Duong 2010) (Sharma 2015).  
The treaty was conceptualized in a post-World War II context in which the nations of 
Europe were participating in relief programs aimed at rebuilding populations and resettling 
victims of extreme violence and human rights violations. The Convention defined a refugee as: 
Any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 an owing to a  
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself to the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
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of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such 
fear, unwilling to return to it (Sharma 2015).  
According to the UNHCR, this Convention was written in a Euro-centric context which limited 
the concept of refugee both temporally to the post-WWII period and geographically to Europe. 
However, as Bonita Sharma notes, during the same period of time, there were global atrocities 
and mass displacements occurring outside of Europe which were excluded from protection under 
this convention. For example, during the Partition of British India in 1947, these international 
governing bodies provided little to no aid relief to the millions affected and resulted in forced 
displacement and genocide of over 14 million (Sharma 2015). Given the limited scope of the 
Convention, in 1967 a Protocol was signed by 146 countries that omitted these temporal and 
geographical conditions (Office of the United Nations High Commisioner For Refugees 2015).   
 Academic scholars like Karen Musalo assert that the definition of refugee put forward by the 
United Nations (UN), which was created in a post-war atmosphere for the resettlement of 
European refugees, is limited to a western perspective of persecution and excludes third world 
refugees, whose “flight is more often prompted by a natural disaster, war or broadly based 
political and economic turmoil” (Duong 2010) (Musalo, Moore, and Boswell 2011). The 
UNHCR does recognize internally displaced people affected by environmental change as 
environmentally displaced people; however, this does not protect those who are internationally 
displaced and has several shortcomings (Biermann & Boas, 2010) (Duong 2010) (Fernández 
2015). For example, the term environmentally displaced people is only a descriptive term, and 
does little to command obligation and action (Biermann & Boas, 2010). One option to expand 
legal protections provided to environmental migrants is to adapt the UNHCR definition of 
‘refugee’ to include climate change victims, (Kolmannskog 2012). While the UNHCR is often 
times considered the benchmark for refugee law, this does not mean that migration or refugee 
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status will not undergo a transformation or change. This is evidenced by other international 
migration organizations and mechanisms that have drastically changed their outlook to and 
treatment of different types of migrants. Additionally, the UN itself seems to be in a transitory 
phase in which they are trying to create and recognize a unified discourse on those affected by 
other factors including climate change displacement. In 2011, the former High Commissioner of 
the UNHCR, Antonio Guterres acknowledged that “patterns of movement are changing” and that 
“the traditional distinction between migrants who cross borders in search of a better life and 
refugees who are forced to flee persecution and conflict, has become blurred” (Guterres 2011). 
He also specifically mentioned climate change refugees and conceded the international 
community’s failure to address climate change in an effective manner because of its weak 
political and cooperative will to reduce the negative impact of climate change and recognize 
migration stimulated by environmental factors as valid (UNHCR 2011). Additionally, on 
September 19th 2016, at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, the New York Declaration 
was signed, acknowledging the complex and nuanced link between climate change and 
migration, and its various effects (United Nations 2016). This slight yet novel institutional shift 
demonstrates that the forced migration discourse is constantly adapting to different contexts and 
situations; the lack of a unifying stance regarding climate change migration does not disqualify 
or invalidate the migrants themselves, but instead points to a changing world in which 
organizations and people must adapt policy and discourse consistently. 
1.32 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
Although the intergovernmental institution, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) does not exclusively recognize migrants fleeing the 21st century effects of anthropogenic 
climate change, in 2007, they expanded their definition of “environmental migrants.” 
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“Environmental migrant: In the absence of an international consensus, IOM has proposed 
a working definition of ‘environmental migrants’ as ‘persons or groups of persons who, 
for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect 
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do 
so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or 
abroad” (IOM 2015). 
This definition evokes a human rights framework, similar to the one used to defend climate 
change migration, by providing protections to those displaced by factors outside of their control. 
Thus, the IOM recognizes that displacement due to environmental factors violates basic human 
rights, and recognizes that groups affected by such displacement should be afforded international 
protection. In doing so, the IOM is beginning to develop an international regime for 
environmental migrants. Overall, the IOM has put climate change and environmental migration 
on the international agenda; they have included migration for environmentally induced reasons in 
a number of United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC) Protocols and have 
prioritized increasing awareness of climate change and creating a legal mechanism for ensuring 
the rights of and protecting environmental/climate change induced migrants (IOM 2015).  
1.33 Other International Institutions 
The Nansen Initiative is a state-led process led by the Governments of Switzerland and 
Norway started in 2012 that seeks to build consensus and a unified discourse on environmentally 
induced migration, whether it is caused by acute natural disasters or long-term climate change.  
The organization mainly works by consulting affected nations and communities on how to build 
an adequate response to the threat of cross-border displacement. The Nansen Initiative is the first 
of its kind to recognize the threat of climate change migration as legitimate and to offer policy 
recommendations to affected countries on how to build strategic plans to confront the issue of 
climate change migration (Kälin 2015).   
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While no international consensus has been reached on the recognition and protection of 
climate change refugees, there are many regional and transboundary versions of a legitimate 
‘climate change migrant’ that serve to emphasize the need for such global institutions. These 
regional consensuses do recognize the legitimacy of climate change induced displacement. The 
1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa held by the 
Organization of African Unity drafted in response to environmental crises and desertification in 
the continent as well as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees both aim to recognize, 
protect, and resettle those fleeing from events seriously disturbing public order, of which climate 
change induced migration is a recognized as legitimate (Brown 2015). Additionally, 
governments, like that of Sweden, legally do recognize environmental factors as reasons to be 
granted asylum (Albrecht and Plewa 2015). Overall, these modern mechanisms demonstrate that 
many organizations and institutions have realized the humanitarian and international imperative 
to acknowledge and aid climate change or environmental refugees. 
1.4 Chapter Conclusion 
Overall, this chapter highlights two major points regarding the ‘climate change refugee 
discourse.’ Firstly, it is a relatively new concept rooted in human rights and humanitarian 
discourses that has gained much academic attention, and mostly adopted by Western institutions 
and intergovernmental organizations. Secondly, the discourse focuses primarily on the future 
mass displacement of vulnerable populations and advocates for their international protection; it 
assumes environment and climate change are unilinear vectors that prompt forced migration and 
create ‘refugees’ (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). There are debates within the discourse itself of 
what a ‘climate change refugee’ is and the current protection afforded by various institutions is 
not global in nature. 
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However, within the broader academic literature, there have been arguments that this 
‘climate change refugee’ discourse is one that is abstract, broad, and overly simplistic. Academic 
articles are increasingly skeptical of the assumption that climate change itself will result in 
increased migration and critical of the apocalyptic narrative of “massive, abrupt and unavoidable 
flows of climate migrants” paraded by this discourse (Bettini 2013). By focusing on South Asia, 
I will apply a relatively broad and abstract internationally accepted concept to a region of the 





Chapter 2 - Migration in South Asia: Past and Present 
2.1 Chapter Objectives  
This chapter will approach historical and current migration patterns in South Asia using 
the ‘climate change’ refugee discourse highlighted above. To begin, this chapter will discuss 
migration theory, or why and how individuals, families and groups choose to move, and the 
international and regional protections that exist if they should. Then, it will segue into a brief 
discussion of how South Asians in the past have moved and how this has changed in present 
times. The chapter will also discuss the complexity of migration in South Asia, especially in 
regards to climate change and development; a feature often muted by the ‘climate change 
refugee’ discourse, which focuses mostly on protecting climate-displaced migrants, highlighted 
above. Overall, this chapter will demonstrate the complexity regarding migration in the South 
Asia, as well as important features of migration in this subcontinent to help draft a robust critique 
of the international ‘climate change refugee’ discourse.  
2.2 Migration Theory and Climate Change 
For millennia, there have been significant flows of individuals and families throughout 
the South Asian region. Sometimes, these migrations are temporary, voluntary or seasonal, while 
in other cases, entire families and clans have been uprooted and displaced to new homes (Ghosh 
2004). These mass migrations have been triggered by a multitude of factors; war, famine, 
environmental disaster or the hope for a better life or improved economic and social prospects. 
Overall, migration is a significant social occurrence that has important effects not only on history 
and culture of societies, but also the well-being, mental, psychological and physical state, as well 
as the psyche of migrants themselves (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003).  
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Migration is a complex trade-off for those choosing to move; they must assess what they 
will gain, and what they will lose. In simplest terms, migration is governed by the relationship 
between push- and pull factors. Push factors, like persecution, environmental disaster, war, and 
poverty, among others, often forcefully, trigger migrants to leave, while pull-factors, like 
economic opportunity and better prospects serve as less severe reasons to relocate to a new 
home. When one or both of these factors outweigh reasons to stay, basic theory suggests that 
migration will occur.  
In addition to these push-pull factors, scholars like Douglas Massey emphasize the 
importance of social or family networks in both facilitating and preventing migration (Massey, 
Axinn, and Ghimire 2016). These social or family networks bring with them a sense of 
belonging to a certain place and shared history, culture and common origin. While these 
networks can serve to create strong community, economic, and political bonds, thereby 
discouraging migration, they can ease migration by lowering costs of and risks associated with 
movement and providing an already existing source of social and economic capital for newer 
migrants (Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire 2016). Overall, the existence and importance of such 
networks tend to complicate migration decisions.  
When talking about environmental or climate change refugees, the migration literature 
often refers to distress migration patterns, which are triggered by drastic changes in the 
environment that compromises the resources necessary for survival or a place’s general 
inhabitability. In the past, migration due to environmental reasons, which was first brought to 
international attention by Essam El-Hinnawi of the United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP) in the 1980s, was placed into three main categories; migration that was temporary and 
due to a natural or anthropogenic natural hazard, permanent displacement due to drastic 
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environmental degradation, and displacement, whether temporary or permanently to slow onset 
environmental deterioration (climate change) (Naser 2011).  
However, even in these environmental displacement situations, individuals, families and 
societies still evaluate and assess major push and pull factors before making migration decisions. 
Distress migration is not only shaped by environmental conditions, but also local and external 
institutions (Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). In short, environmental change or destruction 
is not the only factor influencing migration. Scholars have noted that a person’s decision to 
migrate is influenced by many factors; including financial capital, social capital, conditions or 
prospects at home, and conditions or prospects in the future destination (Raleigh, Jordan, and 
Salehyan 2008) (Naser 2011). Additionally, social capital networks influences distress migration; 
individuals use their involvement in such networks to guide migration decisions (Douglas S. 
Massey, Joaquín Arango 2006). Often times, lack of social networks may stimulate migration, 
whereas strong community social and economic ties may abate migration. Overall, distress 
migrations are complex and variable in nature. It becomes difficult to pinpoint exact reasons for 
migration between individuals even from the same community. 
Distress migration literature has often demonstrated that temporary or permanent 
migration due to environmental threats is most likely to be local or internal in nature. While 
rural-to-urban migration is thought of as common due to deteriorating environmental conditions, 
there are significant numbers of people who participate in rural-to-rural migration in response to 
environmental change or disaster (Revi 2008) (Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). In distress 
migration situations, migrant flows may be different depending on the context. It is often 
theorized that in migration due to slow onset environmental deterioration situations, first 
individuals without dependents leave, then older men and then families, with those who are most 
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reliant on the community’s cultural and historical roots most likely to resist any form of 
relocation (Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). Additionally, Naser and Raleigh et al. cite that 
in most forms of distress migration, including famine, flood and drought, distress migrants tend 
to return to their homes after the environmental threat disappears (Naser 2011) (Raleigh, Jordan, 
and Salehyan 2008). 
Permanent migration as a result of an environmental disaster or climate change signaled a 
state-deficient response or failure on part of the particular nation-state to rebuild and rehabilitate 
communities (Tacoli 2009). However, in more recent literature, especially in the context of 
irreversible climate change, migration is being seen more and more as a pre-cautionary 
adaptation strategy to severe climate change threats (Tacoli 2009). However, as climate 
researchers in Bangladesh have noted, while many locals see migration as an effective climate 
change or environmental disaster adaptation strategy, it is not used exclusively (Stojanov et al. 
2016). Instead, these migration or non-migration decisions take place amongst multiple 
competing conditions, such as poverty, population density, governance, and economic condition. 
Additionally, migration itself serves as an adaption practice, not just for climate change induced 
environmental degradation, but also to mitigate poverty, unemployment and other socioeconomic 
conditions. Migration in general has potential impacts on human and economic development, 
security and environment as well with influxes and camp settlement of migrants changing host 
landscapes and ecosystems.  
As environmental threats increase in severity and frequency due to anthropogenic climate 
change, the applicability and appropriateness of previous interpretations of how migration 
decisions occur may change. Climate change has the ability to impact other factors in migration 
decisions, such as poverty, unemployment, and conflict; thus, even if environmental degradation 
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itself is not a primary driver for migration, it continues to play a significant role in the overall 
context within which migration decisions occur. As South Asia demonstrates complex migration 
flows, these migrant fluxes may change drastically due to changing climates and environments.  
2.3 Brief History of Migration Patterns in South Asia 
 South Asia poses an interesting migration case study. The region has been a meeting 
point for different cultures, civilizations and religions throughout its history. In the past 100 
years, most migration within the region has been provoked by political persecution, lack of 
economic opportunity and the search for improved livelihoods. In 1947, the largest migration 
within South Asia occurred with the Partition of British India into the modern countries of India 
and Pakistan (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003). Almost 14 million Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs 
of majority Bengali and Punjabi backgrounds were displaced and forced to make new homes in 
newly created countries. Since then, political, religious, and ethnic persecution stemming from 
conflict has contributed to major refugee flows of: ~1 million Sri Lankan Tamils from Sri Lanka 
to India since 1954, ~10 million Bangladeshis to India in 1971, ~3 million+ Afghans from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan since 1978, which continues today, ~100,000+ Tibetans to India from 
1958, and ~600,000 Bhutanese of Nepali origin from Bhutan to Nepal since 1990 (Ghosh 2004). 
Controversial on-going migrant flows from Afghanistan to Pakistan, Nepal to India, and 
Bangladesh to Assam, India have caused considerable discussion around migration and 
national/regional security in the subcontinent (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003). Additionally, 
South Asia produces a significant amount of labor migrants to Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East who seek employment opportunities and better economic prospects than those they can find 
at home (Asian Development Bank 2012).   
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 While every country in South Asia has produced or hosted refugees except the Maldives, 
it is concerning that out of the South Asian countries, only Afghanistan has signatory status to 
the 1951 Convention and has ratified the 1967 Protocol (Office of the United Nations High 
Commisioner For Refugees 2015). The other South Asian countries allow UNHCR to host 
certain programs within their nations, but there is no formal recognition of the terms and 
conditions outlined by the Convention or Protocol regarding refugee rights, treatment, or 
organizations (Sharma 2015).  
 South Asian non-signatories point to multiple reasons for not acknowledging this 
important international convention concerning migration. By signing the Convention, these 
nations in South Asia would lose their ability to evaluate and confront refugee crises on an ad 
hoc basis. The Ministry of External Affairs of India considered the Convention and Protocol “a 
partial regime for refugee protection drafted in a Euro-centric context” even after India became a 
member of the UNHCR Executive Committee (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003). 
Additionally, many South Asian nations have less infrastructure, lower quality of living 
and less money to set aside for relief and refugee programs than many of the developed countries 
who recognize these treaties. The question of burden-sharing and economic cost is relevant in 
this context since the financing of refugee support is not addressed by the terms of the 
Convention. Academic V. Suryanarayanan indicates that the UNHCR resorts to “burden-
shifting” in which receiving or host countries must pay the economic, social and environmental 
costs of taking in refugees, while refugee-producing countries have no further obligation or 
responsibility to these displaced peoples (Suryanarayanan 2003). Overall, the lack of 
engagement with international migration conventions demonstrates that perhaps South Asia is 
unique in its migration patterns and ability to absorb and deal with migrants.  
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 The ease in crossing borders, whether they are internal or international, contributes to the 
unique pattern of migration in the region. Historically, many tribal, ethnic and traditional groups 
traversed the different regions of the subcontinent seasonally in search of land and employment. 
The shared history, culture, ethnic identity and language throughout the border areas of many 
South Asian countries have contributed to national borders being relatively permeable as well as 
a marked difficulty in determining if someone is a non-citizen after an international border-
crossing event. For example, open borders currently exist between Nepal and India under the 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship ratified in 1951, while Bangladeshi populations have crossed 
relatively easily into the Indian state of Assam in search of employment and to avert significant 
environmental coastline degradation in Bangladesh (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003).  
However, while the multicultural and multi-ethnic nature of many South Asian countries 
has contributed to the region being more welcoming to migrants, this has also contributed to 
intercommunity strife that in turn produces migrant flows. Perhaps one of the most unique 
features of migration in South Asia is that most migration is either confined internally or at least 
within the South Asian region. South Asia produces a high number of Internally Displaced 
Peoples (IDPs), who move from their homes to different parts of their country for a wide variety 
of issues stemming from poverty, environmental degradation or communal tensions (Chari, 
Joseph, and Chandran 2003). Most commonly, rural-to-urban migration occurs, resulting in 
overpopulation and other concerns in megacities like Mumbai, Karachi, Delhi, Dhaka, and 
Kolkata. The creation and maintenance of slums and poor, underdeveloped communities for rural 
migrants in cities is common and makes the region as a whole more vulnerable to climate change 
impacts (Werz and Hoffman 2015) (Revi 2008).  
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Overall, the history of migration and migration policy in South Asia is multi-faceted and 
complex. Various factors contribute to individuals’ and families’ decisions to migrate. As stated 
previously, it will be important to quantify how climate change will factor into risk assessments 
and decisions regarding migration and how these affect South Asian migration patterns.  
2.4 Climate Change Migration Patterns in South Asia 
Climate change impacts in different regions of the world depend on three factors; 
sensitivity, adaptability and vulnerability (Fritz 2010). Sensitivity refers to the degree 
populations are affected by climate change and its environmental consequences; climate change 
may either improve living conditions or disrupt them to varying degrees. Adaptive capacity, or 
adaptability and vulnerability refer to the ability of a region to adapt to climate change effects 
and how vulnerable such a region is to the negative impacts of climate change. These three 
factors all interface and affect migration decisions and patterns (Fritz 2010). Overall, many 
proponents of the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse often use South Asia an example of a place 
where out-migration due to climate change impacts induced environmental degradation will be 
common. This section will investigate how climate change conditions in the South Asian nations 
are affecting migration patterns in South Asia to draft a more realistic and concise perspective of 
what is happening in this climate vulnerable region.  
2.41 Afghanistan and Pakistan 
As noted previously in the chapter, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have seen significant 
migration flows due to complex factors including war and conflict, persecution, and poverty. 
However, both regions will be affected by climate change in a range of ways that will affect 
people’s ability to live, and this will have an important interaction with existing push-and-pull 
factors regarding migration. To begin, Pakistan is slated to experience a wide variety of climate 
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change effects. Coastal cities as well as islands off the coast of southern Pakistan are expected to 
experience significant sea-level rise and an increase in severity and frequency of cyclones (Asian 
Development Bank 2011). Already, people have begun leaving these islands for other coastal 
cities or regions of Pakistan. In addition, other climate change effects will include salination of 
drinking water and polluting of water and agricultural resources. Additionally, central Pakistan 
including the Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa regions have already seen an increase in the 
frequency and severity of droughts and floods, which have had significant impacts on 
agricultural output and livelihoods, especially for poorer families (Abid et al. 2016).  
 Similarly, in Afghanistan, it has been estimated that only 6-15% of land is usable due to 
anthropogenic environmental degradation from use of war machinery and chemicals coupled 
with climate change. In the past, Afghanistan boasted natural forests that now face severe 
degradation, loss of vegetation and soil erosion, which contributes to producing an even more 
arid, uninhabitable climate. Overall, the climate academic Daud Saba asserts that Afghanistan is 
undergoing an uncontrollable environmental crisis that has not received adequate international, 
regional or national attention and is unprecedented in history (Saba 2001).  
 In both nations, there has been a marked increase in migration from rural to urban 
settings; Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad have swelling populations and all three are expected to 
become megacities in the next 50 years. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for 
migration as they range from economic despair, to environmental degradation, to political, ethnic 
or religious persecution, or combinations of multiple factors (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003). 
Additionally, the higher level of rural-to-urban migration is putting severe constraints on urban 
resources to provide for growing populations. This, in turn, affects urban environmental health 
and will have significant impacts if continued unchecked. Finally, while most migration occurs 
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either within national borders or between the countries, there are increasing numbers of Afghans, 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshi migrants making up global migrant/refugee flows. In the past 10 
years, South Asians have made up a significant portion of international asylees and migrants for 
a variety of reasons, including environmental degradation (Chari, Joseph, and Chandran 2003).  
2.42 India and Bangladesh 
India, due to its size and population, is also expected to witness a wide range of climate 
change consequences. In general, coastal regions are threatened by sea-level rise and tropical 
storms, while land locked areas have seen an increase in the severity and frequency of drought, 
floods. Like Pakistan and Afghanistan, internal migration is commonplace, with factors 
prompting migration being complex and intertwined. In its international report, the IPCC 
reported that sea levels in India are rising 2.4 mm per year; by 2050, there will be a 38 cm rise in 
sea level that will disproportionately affect low lying coastal areas and islands, potentially 
displacing thousands (Asian Development Bank 2011). Additionally, the Asian Development 
Bank predicts that by 2050, 1.4 billion Indians will be living in areas experiencing negative 
climate change impacts (Asian Development Bank 2011). Overall, the changing weather patterns 
in the country particularly affect the already poor and marginalized as rural areas most impacted 
have the least resources to adapt to climate change, thus influencing migration patterns. 
Most Indians migrate internally, with rural-to-urban migration being the most common; 
around 10-25% of displaced populations move to urban centers and form part of squatter 
settlements. These urban migrants cite economic factors, employment opportunities and 
environmental degradation as reasons for relocating. However, rural-to-rural migration is 
significant with a large number of displaced peoples moving to equally vulnerable nearby 
villages and towns instead of massive urban centers. Authors also cite that migration due to 
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environmental factors has not been consistent in India; for example, in 1983 and 1994-5, 
migration in response to drought only occurred in 2% of affected Indian households (Raleigh, 
Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). This may be because drought was not severe enough to instigate 
migration; however, other scholars emphasize that remittances from labor migrants from affected 
regions gave families economic support to continue living in those droughts affected areas 
(Warner et al. 2010) (Black et al. 2011). In October 2013, in response to Cyclone Phailin in the 
state of Orissa, there were large-scale migrations of the affected fishing community, and severe 
flash floods in the Himalayas in 2013 led to increased migration to urban settings due to extreme 
effects on people’s livelihoods (Lal 2016).  
Overall, India has received an enormous number of Bangladeshi migrants who mostly 
migrate to the Indian states of Assam, West Bengal and sometimes the Union territory of New 
Delhi. Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world and has the least resources to 
adapt to climate change. The country has already seen severe and frequent floods, tropical 
cyclones and storm surges due to climate change, which have significant impacts on 
Bangladesh’s coastal population. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, estimates 
that 30 million people will become climate migrants by 2050 (Lal 2016). Additionally, low-lying 
coastal areas of the country are severely threatened by sea-level rise. While research shows that 
most disaster displaced Bangladeshis only travel an average of 2 miles away from their homes, 
the number of Bangladeshis crossing international borders illegally has increased significantly 
(Asian Development Bank 2012).  
The regions most affected are the ecologically diverse Sundarbans of India and 
Bangladesh. Here, sea levels are rising twice as fast as the global average and climate scientists 
estimate that much of the delta could be completely submerged in the next half-century. Climate 
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expert Abhinav Mohapatra concludes that this could cause and as already started a mass exodus 
from the region where 13 million Indians and Bangladeshis already live (Lal 2016). Already, 
displacement from coast to coast or island to island between India and Bangladesh is common, 
usually among the most marginalized agricultural laborers known locally as Adivasi (Lal 2016). 
Overall, illegal migration in the Sundarbans and from Bangladesh to India has become a tense 
political issue between the two nations with India claiming national security threats due to the 
higher and higher numbers of illegal migrants. Because of increased internal and regional 
migration, there have been increased pressures on land and economic resources in both nations. 
Especially coupled with urbanization, cities and city slums are becoming inundated with 
marginalized and impoverished migrants who continue to strain civic services and urban 
infrastructures. The Center for American Progress continues to emphasize the critical impact 
climate change will have on migration patterns and already tense security protocols between the 
two nations (Werz and Hoffman 2015).  
Overall, in countries like India and Bangladesh, climate change and environmental 
disasters cause varied migration responses. While the rising sea levels in the Sundarbans and 
coastal regions have prompted significant out-migration, this may not be the case in other areas 
of the country. Research analyses of individuals’ decision making strategies during the 1988 
Bangladeshi floods demonstrate that if disaster aid to affected regions ran smoothly, people did 
not move from the affected area (Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). Thus, disaster aid and 
development play significant roles in instigating or preventing migration flows.  
2.43 Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka  
According to the Asian Development Bank, Bhutan has not displayed and is not predicted 
to experience severe climate change effects and/or migration due to such effects (Asian 
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Development Bank 2011). Coastal areas of Sri Lanka are threatened by sea-level rise while 
tropical and sub-tropical areas of the country are slated to experience increasing temperatures, 
which will affect livability and agricultural output. Additionally, flash floods have become 
frequent throughout the country, with the most recent in 2011 impacting around 1 million people.  
Nepal, which shares an open border with India, has already undergone severe climate 
change consequences, and with the open borders with India, it is hard to estimate just how many 
Nepalis have been displaced and have migrated to India and for what reasons. Similar to the rest 
of South Asia, Nepal has already seen severe effects of climate change. More extreme monsoon 
rainfall, landslides and floods are expected to affect the livelihoods of Nepalis in hills, mountains 
and cities in the Himalayan ranges. Additionally, there has been a significant increase in rural-to-
urban migration to Kathmandu, especially due to the recent earthquake that has paralyzed the 
country.  
Similar to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, Nepal is a major exporter of 
temporary unskilled labor to Gulf States and other areas around the world. The remittances sent 
by these labor migrants to their families in cities or villages in Nepal are extremely important for 
their day-to-day lives and plays a role in how they continue to live in an environmentally 
deteriorating state (Asian Development Bank 2011).  
2.44 The Maldives 
The Maldives are characterized as a small island state and are a low-lying archipelago 
nation which is comprised of 1190 islands and 26 coastal coral reef atolls and that has a 
population of ~350,000. Around 80% of the Maldives’ land is less than 1 meter above sea level 
(Arnall and Kothari 2015). The Maldivian former president brought to the public eye the climate 
change consequences of sea-level rise on the Maldives when he held a cabinet meeting 
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underwater complete with wetsuits before the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 to showcase 
the bleak future of the island nation (Arnall and Kothari 2015)(Kothari 2014). According to a 
2007 IPCC report, sea level rises of 18-59 cm, which are predicted using the ‘business-as-usual” 
climate change scenario by 2100, would make the low-lying nation uninhabitable (Ahmed and 
Suphachalasai 2014). The Maldivian population is often referred to as “canaries in the cold 
mine,” in regards to their and other low-lying island nations primary vulnerability to climate 
change and their status as the first to experience climate change affects (Asian Development 
Bank 2011). The Maldives has also become representative of adverse climate change 
consequences and a producer of ‘climate change refugees’ for the stark future predictions place 
on the ability of humans to continue living on the ‘sinking’ islands and atolls. In addition to 
severe sea-level rise, the Maldives is also threatened by coastal erosion, salinity intrusion, 
changes in monsoon patterns, and flood and drought. The central government has invested in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and has advocated for the rest of the world to 
do so because of the severe threats posed to this collection of low-lying islands and atolls. The 
country became the first to ratify plans to go carbon-neutral in 2009, and has also held important 
conferences on climate change and climate change effects. At the Small States Conference on 
Sea Level Rise, the UNEP and other nations signed the Male Declaration on Global Warming 
and Sea-Level Rise and started the Ocean and Coastal Areas Program Activity Center to provide 
support to affected national governments and evaluate possible effects of climate change 
(Stojanov et al. 2016).  
Migration has been an integral part of life in the Maldives. Islanders often migrate from 
island to island, or from island to mainland in search of better livelihoods or for other social, 
economic, environmental or security reasons. Stojanov asserts that there is a diversity of 
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migration typologies in the Maldives with a single factor rarely being the exclusive cause of a 
migration decision; in fact, in his study he found that only 2% of survey respondents selected 
environmental conditions or natural hazards as decisive factors of migrating (Stojanov et al. 
2016). In 2004, a severe tsunami hit the Maldives and compromised several communities. 
Individual voluntary migration and government funded resettlement programs to other islands 
not affected were created as part of disaster relief. However, as Stojanov demonstrates, although 
climate change impacts may play a more serious role in migration decisions in the future, 
currently, out-migration as adaptation to environmental degradation or climate change is a last 
resort for many individuals and families (Stojanov et al. 2016).  
2.5 Common Themes and Chapter Conclusion  
Perhaps the most concerning climate change consequence in South Asia will be sea-level 
rise affecting coastal and island populations across South Asia. According to the Asian 
Development Bank, 27 million people in India alone will be at risk from rising sea levels by 
2050 (Asian Development Bank 2011). Coastal urban centers in the region like Dhaka, Mumbai 
and Kolkata, are at immediate increased risk because of the populations they hold and the 
relatively low level of infrastructure and development to mitigate these rising sea levels. 
Additionally, these are the cities many from rural and other areas often migrate towards for a 
wide variety of reasons, including environmental degradation and climate change. There is 
potential for catastrophic disaster and displacement in these urban centers if these are not 
addressed as these urban centers are characterized by poorly maintained, basic infrastructures, 
unprecedented and unplanned growth and meager living conditions (Revi 2008) (Tacoli 2009). 
Also, the climate change impacts of increased sea levels, salination of water resources, flooding, 
drought and other effects can have on day-to-day life and agriculture throughout the subcontinent 
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have and may stimulate migration in the future (Werz and Hoffman 2015). Climate change 
effects that compromise people’s livelihood and impact economic and social stability may 
prompt changes to already existing migration patterns. 
Additionally, labor migration contributes to migrant flows in the region and the high 
volume of rural-to urban relocation and international displacement. In discussing global 
protection for vulnerable migrants, the numbers of Afghans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
displaced and seeking asylum or refugee status in Europe and other Western nations is of 
concern. In recent years, due to the diminishing conflict in Afghanistan and relative political 
stability of the rest of the subcontinent, these migrants do not qualify under current international 
refugee law for protection. These migrants are often labeled ‘economic’ or ‘environmental’ 
migrants and there are reports of many being turned away and deported back to unstable 
environments. As discussed in the first chapter, this has significant consequences in terms of 
human rights and humanitarianism and must be addressed if these flows continue or increase.  
Finally, migration and climate change migration have significant intersections with gender. The 
Asian Development Bank and other authors report that environmental disaster increases 
women’s vulnerability to human trafficking, abuse and gender-based violence as livelihoods are 
lost and socioeconomic status and stability becomes compromised (Asian Development Bank 
2012) (Martine et al. 2009). Additionally, migration in South Asia is a highly-gendered process; 
for example, while, most migrants from Nepal are male, the overwhelming majority from Sri 
Lanka is women. These gender patterns lie in complex socioeconomic conditions that alter 
migrant flows. Throughout South Asia, it is not uncommon for households under economic or 
environmental pressures to send a male member of the family to work abroad and send 
remittances. However, recently, this pattern has begun to change as more and more women move 
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for domestic employment opportunities or to enter the unskilled labor market in Gulf States or 
the West. This has lasting effects on gender dynamics, power relationships, and women’s rights 
as whole in the South Asian context (Asian Development Bank 2011).  
Overall, the discussion surrounding migration in a South Asian context demonstrates its 
complexity. Climate change impacts are beginning to play a much bigger role in migration 






Chapter 3 – South Asian Voices: Differing Perspectives 
3.1 Chapter Objectives  
The global narrative concerning climate change migration as discussed in Chapter 1 
focuses mostly on the production and protection of current and future climate change refugees. 
However, as shown above, the history of migration and current migration patterns in South Asia 
do not necessarily fit the discourse of climate change as a primary driver of displacement. As 
Farbotko asserts, the climate refugee narrative is perpetuated despite the “invisibility of much 
climate change phenomena to the naked eye or layperson’s perspective”  (Farbotko and Lazrus 
2012). The many interpretations of how climate change impacts individuals’ livelihoods and 
possibility for migration demonstrates that the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse may be 
ignoring the larger picture in which migration occurs. In this chapter, I will investigate 
something often ignored by international agendas and discourses, not just the numbers of South 
Asian individuals displaced, but also their voices. I will demonstrate the diversity in perspectives 
among this population to assess how appropriate the climate change refugee discourse is in this 
region of the world. In this chapter, I will use both media and academic research representations 
of climate migrants to demonstrate how voices and stories are used to promote the ‘climate 
change refugee’ agenda or critique it.  
3.2 Media and Discourse Representations 
 Much of the media concerning ‘climate change refugees’ uses alarming titles, predicting 
mass flows of migrants from rapidly disintegrating environments. Critics highlight that these 
migrants are represented as ‘victims of climate change’ and their status as ‘climate change 
refugees’ is examined to the extent that alternative adaptation or migration strategies are little 
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discussed (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012) (Bettini 2013). Thus, climate migration is often only 
represented as a crisis of ‘climate refugees.’  
Most popular media articles focus on the climate change affects in the Sundarbans and 
coastal areas of Bangladesh and northeast India, especially highlighting the internationally 
displaced people. These articles focus on stories of climate disaster that prompts inevitable 
migration and constant fear of deportation in the host-nation due to the lack of recognized 
international or regional legal protection. Additionally, since the recent European and global 
refugee crisis, media outlets have linked climate change migration to the production of political 
refugees. Articles in Foreign Policy, the Guardian, and Al Jazeera entitled the “The Pariahs of 
the Global Refugee Flood,” “Failure to act on Climate Change means an even Bigger Refugee 
Crisis,” and “Where will the climate refugees go?” respectively add to the narrative that climate 
change exists only as a ‘threat multiplier’ with impacts on international security and livelihoods  
(Baker 2015) (Bennett 2015). These articles use images of massive, uncontrollable migrant 
floods from South Asia to argue for legal recognition and protection of ‘climate change 
refugees.’ In the Foreign Policy article, the unique position of South Asian, including 
Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Afghan migrants who flee to the West for economic reasons or 
displacement by climate change are considered. As these migrants are not considered individuals 
fleeing political oppression, rather considered migrants seeking better economic prospects and 
lives, they are not afforded mechanisms by which they can seek international protection. They 
continue contributing to the flows of migrants from the Global South into Europe, which in more 
recent years, has been met with hostility and xenophobia. The article itself does little to connect 
these migrants’ decisions to leave to environmental degradation or climate change, with one of 
their subjects asserting that a lack of employment and poor economic conditions ultimately 
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pushed him out of Bangladesh. However, the article itself discusses mass refugee flows due to 
climate change and the need for an encompassing protection under the UNHCR convention or 
other mechanisms for environmental or climate induced migrants.  
In many ways, as Bettini notes, these articles as well as the overall discourse contribute to 
the growing ‘apocalyptic’ or ‘dystopian’ narrative or rhetoric concerning climate change 
migration (Bettini 2013). Words like ‘catastrophe,’ ‘disaster’ and ‘urgency’ are used commonly, 
and climate migrants are painted as amorphous, homogenous masses ultimately seeking basic 
refuge and protection. The articles themselves rely on statistics predicting massive displacements 
without necessarily specifying where the numbers themselves come from or who they represent.  
Deliberate photos and South Asian voices are used to further this discourse, with selected 
subjects highlighting extreme poverty, significant environmental degradation, familial deaths, 
and lack of government or international protection. In these articles, migrants take the status of 
the ‘victim,’ who is both feared by, yet must be protected by the international community. For 
example, an Inter Press Service (IPS) News Agency article entitled, “A Precarious Fate for 
Climate Migrants in India,” uses the story of climate change migrants who have resettled in India 
(Lal 2016). Sanjeela Shaikh, a farmer from the Bangladeshi coastal district of Bhola, lost her 
entire family, possessions and agricultural fields to severe flooding. She is quoted saying, “I’ve 
accepted my fate. There’s no future for me in Bangladesh,” after she relocated to New Delhi 
India (Lal 2016). Additionally, Zahida Begum, who is reported living in the Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh with her 5-member family, stated, 
 “When we’d just shifted, we used to spend entire days hiding. Now we just pretend 
we’re from Indian state of West Bengal as we speak the same language and other cultures 
are also quite similar. However, we’re petrified of the authorities probing our 
Bangladeshi antecedents. We can be packed off without any questions. But that’s a risk 




 In investigating similar themes in Tuvalu, Farbotko, highlights that ‘climate change 
refugee’ narratives of local Tuvaluans ultimately “evoked a particularly narrow range of subject 
positions for inhabitants of Tuvalu – either a helpless victim or a climate hero,” who despite the 
lack of international protection, still migrates across international borders (Farbotko and Lazrus 
2012). She further asserts that the popular representation of climate change migration in the 
international sphere is problematic; it assumes that displacement and migration is the singular 
product of climate change, and further entrenches the narratives and lived experiences of already 
vulnerable populations against powerful discourses and policies that inadequately represent 
them. These conclusions draw parallels with the representation of South Asian climate migrants; 
often times, migration and migration decisions are generalized and used as evidence to support 
the ‘climate change refugee’ narrative and migration is often presented as something 
international while regional or internal displacements are left unconsidered.  
Overall, media and discourse representations paint a picture of chaotic, grandiose 
changes in migration patterns throughout South Asia, with significant regional and global 
impacts. It highlights the lack of protection for migrants who choose to leave, and often times 
ignores the narratives of those who choose to stay. In doing this, it oversimplifies migration 
decisions and abandons climate change impacts in climate migrant-producing areas.  
3.3 Local and Academic Perspectives  
However, in contrast to the crisis imagery given above, many South Asian voices stand in 
stark contrast to the climate change refugee agenda. In a 2009 Scientific American article, Ainun 
Nishat, the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s representative for Bangladesh is 
quoted saying, 
“Will people leave? Maybe in 100 years, but that is not my priority now. People are 
living in areas that go underwater once in a fortnight in the coastal belt, the point is, 
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they’re still here. They are not migrating today. It is not time to worry about it. My 
priority is the natural disaster that is happening now” (Friedman 2013).  
 
This quote critiques the alarmist nature of much the climate refugee debate, which mostly 
focuses on threats of future displacement and highlights cases that are evidence of such 
displacement. Additionally, Nishat also demonstrates the complexity of climate change and 
migration decisions, emphasizing the adaptive strategies and resilience that members of these 
climate vulnerable communities exhibited in the past and continue to exhibit today. Additionally, 
in the same article, Gaurpodomando, whose entire family fled to India illegally from Bangladesh 
due to floods that affected their fishing livelihood, states, 
“I do feel a little lonely and sad, but I don’t really want to go to India I don’t want to 
leave this place, I don’t want to leave this country. I love this place,” (Friedman 2013) 
 
 regarding his decision to stay in Bangladesh. His response emphasizes the differences in 
migration decisions among members of the same community, highlighting the complexity of 
such decisions and the importance of other factors in such decisions. While climate change 
affects may become much more severe in the future, Gaupodomando’s decision to stay leaves 
him unprotected by such a ‘climate change refugee’ regime that uplifts those who choose to 
migrate. Similar topics are explored in the Thomson Reuters Foundation Article, “As Climate 
Impacts Hit, Pakistan faces Migration Surge – Experts,” which details the experiences of a 
fisherman living on the Pakistani island Hajamaro due to increasing severity and frequency of 
cyclones and other tropic storms coupled with sea-level rise (Saeed 2015). Shafqat Aziz, a food 
security expert at the Dutch affiliate of Oxfam states,  
“Local Adaptation plans can help people ensure their livelihoods and safety in the face of 
calamities like droughts, floods and earthquakes” (Saeed 2015). 
 
 to support his assertion that climate induced migration is not necessary if the government 
supports programs that help populations adapt to and mitigate climate change effects. 
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Mohammed Yusuf, a resident of the Hajamaro island whose family suffers economic loss and 
death due to climate change, further demonstrates the challenges behind migration by stating, 
“If we had sufficient resources to relocate, we would have moved to Thatta city some 
five years ago and quit fishing,” (Saeed 2015). 
 
demonstrating the importance of employment stability and livelihood in migration decisions.  
An article in Global Environmental Change, “Challenging Climate Change and Migration 
Discourse: Different Understandings of Timescale and Temporality in the Maldives,” 
demonstrates the differing perspectives, approaches and descriptive language to climate change 
and migration between ‘elites’ and non-elites’(Arnall and Kothari 2015). The authors point out 
that ‘climate refugee’ discourses often marginalize or ignore the perspectives of ‘non-elites,’ or 
those who are not climate change professionals or experts. The interview-based study concluded 
that overall, the discourse has become “locally appropriated,” with gaps between how such elites 
and non-elites perceive the threat of climate change migration (Arnall and Kothari 2015). The 
researchers pin-pointed temporal differences in perception between the two groups. The first 
being that while elites tended to focus on the distant future distant from the lived experiences of 
non-elites, or the long term, while non-elites tended to focus present, every-day climate change, 
social and economic problems, such as steady employment, education and healthcare.  
Additionally, while elites tended to invoke the ‘crisis’ discourse when discussing climate 
change migration, few non-elites identified mass future displacement or disaster due to climate 
change effects. While a policy maker was quoted saying,  
“People don’t see what is coming. In 20 years, many of these [islands] will not be 
habitable due to saltwater inundation. In 50 years, they might not even exist. It’s like a 
ticking time bomb sitting under people’s noses. People will be forced to move away from 
their islands, which will be bad for them, but they just can’t see it…This is why it’s too 




However, non-elite respondents tended to minimize or reject the significance of rising sea 
levels and other climate change effects. Non-elites already had been integrating climate change 
affects in their everyday lives, and thus, felt more prepared to take on future issues. In 
comprehensive interviews held with members of non-elite and elite individuals in the study, non-
elite respondents did not cite climate change induced sea level rise as a sufficient reason to 
migrate in the future. In such interviews, non-elites downplay or rejected the significance of 
rising sea levels and other climate change effects. One non-elite interviewee stated,  
“We will always survive by building sea walls, floating islands, underwater homes, 
whatever we need to,” (Arnall and Kothari 2015). 
 
demonstrating the belief that adequate and trusted adaptation mechanisms are already in-place to 
counter climate change effects. 
Finally, the article mentioned that migration was something common to both elite and 
non-elite Maldivian life, with individuals and families’ relocating between islands seasonally or 
permanently Maldivians for employment or education. Many individuals used their already 
existent frequent relocation patterns to already create future adaptation strategies, a 25-year old 
respondent stated,  
“I have heard climate change from the television, but I am not so worried… If sea level 
rise occurs, then I will go to Dubai because there is work there and good socioeconomic 
conditions. Then I’ll be able to provide support to my parents and family. Here [in 
Maldives] there is not so much for me as there are no jobs,” (Arnall and Kothari 2015). 
 
In general, the article itself demonstrates the complexity of climate change migration in terms of 
one of the islands most vulnerable to sea-level rise in the world.  Overall, the article concluded 
that in order to reconcile these differences in perspectives towards climate change migration, and 
prevent forcing external, global narratives on Maldivian lives, there must be more dialogue 
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between elites and non-elites to create effective policy interventions to address a wide range of 
perceived issues and barriers.  
To conclude, local and academic perspectives of climate change migration patterns and 
predictions in the South Asian context demonstrate the gaps or inconsistencies in the narrative of 
the ‘climate change refugee.’ South Asian migrants are not a homogenous group and migration 
as adaptation is not a phenomenon that is new. Overall, South Asians, in their migration 
decisions, are considering and evaluating a wide-range of factors.  
3.4 Chapter Conclusion  
Dr. Jamuna Sheshadri, a Delhi University associate professor of Sociology, was quoted in the 
same 2009 Scientific American article discussed above, saying, 
“Everyone knows that climate change is displacing people, but no government is willing 
to acknowledge this officially for fear of having to recognize these people as refugees and 
be held responsible for their welfare,” (Friedman 2013).  
 
The climate change migration debate is one that is diverse. While climate change is a significant 
factor in migration decisions, it still remains unrecognized by most international and regional 
governing bodies. The global responsibility to those impacted by climate change is unaccounted 
for, leaving certain migrants in vulnerable conditions. However, there are diverse perspectives 
among a wide range of South Asian populations regarding climate migration; while it is a serious 
current reality for some, it is seen as less of a threat by others undergoing similar climate change 
pressures. Multiple factors weigh into migration decisions and affect migration patterns during or 
after climate change induced environmental change. South Asian actors have taken advantage of 
a wide range of creative strategies to combat the issue of climate change migration as it occurs 
within their local worlds in the vacuum of comprehensive regional or international action. 
51 
 
Overall, in drafting a climate change migration framework, the diverse perspective and 
adaptation strategies already employed by South Asian populations should be integrated.  
Finally, as will be demonstrated in the next section, climate change ultimately interfaces 
in complex ways with poverty and development as well as history and culture. It becomes 
difficult and problematic to characterize all South Asian climate migrants using global, external 
narratives that emphasize their vulnerability and their status as ‘refugees.’ As will be 
demonstrated more thoroughly in the next section, such rhetoric fails to capture adaptive 
strategies and continued resilience of climate change-affected communities and minimizes their 


















Chapter 4 - A Changing Migrant? Critiques of the ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Discourse 
4.1 Chapter Objectives   
In this chapter, I will critique the ‘climate change refugee discourse’ against the complex 
reality in South Asia. I will also explore the relationship between development, something not 
significantly addressed by the ‘climate change refugee discourse,’ which emphasizes only the 
mass displacement of people from climate vulnerable regions and advocates for their protection. 
While climate change is occurring and climate change effects are serious and will impact 
displacement, highlighting critiques, gaps and consequences of the ‘climate change refugee’ 
discourse will help create a more robust, nuanced framework for climate migrants in the South 
Asian region. Overall, this critique does not serve to reject or deny the reality of climate change 
nor its diverse impact on human life and mobility; however, it creates a narrative that is all-
encompassing, representative of and fair to both scientific and academic findings.  
4.2 A Crisis Narrative  
Climate scholars like Farbotko, Betinni among others have cited that mass relocation or 
displacement due to both slow onset or sudden climatic degradation is unlikely (Farbotko and 
Lazrus 2012) (Bettini 2013). In South Asia, different combinations of social, economic, and 
political factors affect migration decisions. Similar climate change events across the subcontinent 
do not necessarily result in the same level of migration due to varying levels and success of 
disaster risk management programs. There is also a growing body of support for the idea that 
climate change may not result in increased migration patterns, rather may just change existing 
ones. However, the term ‘climate change refugee,’ paints environmental degradation as the sole 
reason for a forced migration, erasing the context in which migration occurs and removing an 
individual’s agency in making a migration decision (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012) (Bettini 2013).  
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However, the ‘climate change refugee discourse’ often portrays a picture in which 
migration is characterized as forced and through the mass, unavoidable production of refugees. 
The use of the word ‘refugee’ is politically and socially charged; the contemporary connotation 
of the word removes agency and power from individuals in making such migration decisions and 
implies the crossing of international borders. The ‘refugee’ narrative  may lock migrants them 
into a category that is not necessarily representative of their situation or the threat against them 
(Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). Validating a term like ‘climate change refugee’ can also impact 
sense of identity, culture and belonging; it can uproot cultures and identities strongly tied to 
specific regions of the world and force migrants to adopt a status that emphasizes their non-
belonging to any state in the world (Crate and Nuttall 2004). As an anti-climate refugee activist 
from the vulnerable Pacific Island of Kiribati sums up, “equity, identity and human rights,” are 
central to climate change migration in regards to vulnerable communities’ perceptions of their 
migration status (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). In the current international political climate in 
which the monitoring of and hostility toward migration has increased, characterizing those 
displaced due to climate change as ‘refugees’ may increase regional and international tensions. 
Hartmann highlights that the current ‘climate change refugee’ discourse has the potential to 
reignite racist fears of massive flows of poor migrants from the Global South and further 
contribute to imageries of migrants as inherent security threats (Hartmann 2010). This presents 
an unrealistic image of climate change migration rather than confronting the fundamental issue 
of climate change and preventing, adapting to, and mitigating its various impacts.  
While climate change migration will occur, presenting it as a migration or refugee crisis 
is neither accurate nor productive. Given that climate change holds a precarious place in 
international and domestic diplomacy, Bettini notes that the severe narrative and imagery 
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disseminated by the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse plays an important role in bolstering 
recognition and acknowledgement of climate change impacts and support for climate change 
programs (Bettini 2013). However, he still remains critical of the ‘apocalyptic’ or ‘crisis’ 
narrative furthered by the discourse mostly conceptualized in the West by climate change 
experts, scientists and advocates who make broad claims about a wide range of vulnerable 
populations. The imagery of a ‘crisis of nature’ and mass migration wrought by climate change 
does not wholly parallel the views and perspectives of climate exposed populations and 
discounts commonplace and already existing migrant patterns and flows (Bettini 2013).  
The ‘climate change refugee’ discourse overall predicts a climate crisis and mass 
migration due to such a crisis. However, in doing so, it decontextualizes and erases already 
existent migration patterns and emphasizes the complete vulnerability and devastation of the 
people, removing their resiliency and agency. As seen in South Asia, already existing adaptive 
migration strategies are in place; migration to different regions of the same country, or 
internationally are intentional, with individuals sending back remittances that are important for 
family members and communities that stay behind. Thus, such a discourse may reorganize power 
relations in a way that vulnerable communities are disenfranchised and unable to make decisions 
independently (Bettini 2013).  Overall, the discourse must be adjusted to reflect what is truly 
happening in the South Asian region and must be adapted to adequately, responsibly and justly 
aid migrants moving due to climate change instead of disempowering them, emphasizing their 
status as victims and forcing them to adopt an international legal label or classification.  
 Finally, given that all except one country in South Asia have not signed conventions like 
the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol concerning forced migration and refugees, it is unlikely 
that they will concede to another international framework recognizing this newer type of ‘climate 
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change refugee.’ Additionally, many South Asian countries themselves do not have substantial 
climate change adaptation strategies in place to cope with their own climate change or migration 
problems. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, a majority of migration stimulated by environmental 
degradation or climate change remains internal or at least confined to regional boundaries. South 
Asian climate change migrants are not expected in large numbers to flee to parts of the world 
other than South Asia. This paradox puts the region in a precarious position in which it will both 
produce and host large numbers of ‘climate change refugees’ under the protection-based 
solutions advocated by the discourse. The ability of the region to do so is questionable given its 
low development indices and lack of current substantial action toward mitigating and adapting to 
climate change.  
4.3 Lessons from South Asia: The Nexus of Climate Change and Development  
South Asia poses an interesting context in which climate change occurs due to its lower 
levels of development and infrastructure. According to the World Bank, in South Asia in 2012, 
~18.8% of the population lived on less than $1.90 a day and millions lived under the absolute 
poverty line. Additionally, large numbers of the population (~200 million) lived in slums and 
~500 million lived without access to electricity (Qian 2017). Throughout the region, there are 
varying development and infrastructure patterns, with some states with higher development 
indices. The variability in regards to development in the region is testament to the complexity 
and challenges it faces in regards to reducing poverty, improving livelihoods and increasing 
resilience of communities. In regards to climate change, it has been cited that low income and 
high levels of poverty aggravate climate change risks and increases severity of environmental 
disasters by increasing the vulnerability of individuals and populations – in short, poor 
development indices reduce adaptive capacity of communities (Climate Change 2014 Synthesis 
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Report IPCC 2014). Additionally, climate change effects and disasters may compromise already 
existing infrastructures, and may increase the future vulnerability of communities, which may 
result in some levels of migration.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are varying climate affects anticipated in the South 
Asian region and past climate events demonstrate the diversity of responses to such disaster. 
Much of this was related to development and infrastructure systems that helped mitigate or adapt 
to climate change affects and thus reduced negative impacts of severe climate change events. 
Fritz notes that environmental migration is often influenced by vulnerability, resilience, and 
adaptability, noting that not everyone in climate vulnerable or susceptible regions will move or 
want to move (Fritz 2010). Overall, vulnerability of communities and individuals is determined 
by access to resources and the effectiveness of such resources. Studies show that much climate 
change adaptation will come from an individual or communities’ own social capital and 
resources. Likewise, human mobility is intrinsically linked to human rights and social and 
political capital; often the poorest and most marginalized are the least likely to migrate due to 
social, political and economic barriers. Thus, social and economic capital facilitate migration, 
making the wealthier more able and likely to migrate as an adaptation strategy to climate change 
events (Naser 2013). This brings a paradox in which migration itself may contribute to the 
weakening of communities by removing the social and economic protection and resources 
provided by its former members. Thus, a discourse which promotes migration out of climate 
vulnerable areas must also acknowledge, provide for, and protect those who decide to stay in 
such vulnerable places.  
Finally, studies in Bangladesh demonstrate that while migration and resettlement is an 
effective adaptation strategy to climate change risk, it also predicts a dip in development and 
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living standards, including the social and economic vulnerability of those who decide to migrate 
(Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008). Within South Asia, a common trend is internal migration 
to urban areas; the significant drain on resources in such cities due to increased in-migration 
results in its poor living conditions and poor, unsustainable infrastructures. Overall, the ‘climate 
change refugee’ discourse must offer more than just legal protection for climate vulnerable 
individuals; it must confront the underlying issues of poor development indices and their relation 
to current and future adverse climate change events.  
Finally, disaster relief and aid programs for climate change risks demonstrate similar 
parallels to development as climate change. These programs are important for increasing the 
resilience of communities and strengthening their adaptive capacity to environmental disaster 
(Asian Development Bank 2012). Poor development patterns will yield poor disaster relief 
programs, yielding more serious complications when future environmental disaster strikes. This 
is seen in the varying migration responses to floods, droughts and landslides throughout the 
subcontinent (Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008)(Naser 2011). Thus, creating adequate 
precautionary infrastructures, improving relief aid and development, to mitigate the impact of 
climate change will be important adaptation strategies for communities.  
While migration has been widely cited to be an effective adaptation strategy to mitigate 
climate change, it is not the only way of responding to climate change disasters and should not 
be the only solution offered by an international or regional framework. Thus, climate change 
migration must be thought of within and as part of a broader development and climate change 
adaptation framework, instead of working solely for the legal protection of vulnerable groups. 
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4.4 Chapter Conclusion: Unintended Consequences 
Overall, the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse currently being discussed by international 
organizations to be implemented as a legal protection for future climate change migrants must be 
adapted. When drafting a new political or social label to represent a group of people, as the 
‘climate change refugee’ does, anticipating negative unintended consequences of such a label is 
necessary. Historical examples of this include the characterization of internally displaced peoples 
(IDPs) and refugees, which has had significant social and political consequences, including 
disenfranchisement of entire populations and vulnerable peoples, and is consistently being 
revisited by international players (UNHCR 2015) (Rajaram 2002). Overall, the current ‘climate 
change refugee’ discourse is one that is broad and that tends to homogenize climate migrants and 
erase the contexts in which environmental disaster and their migration decisions take place. It 
remains separate from other climate mitigation and adaptation strategies and upholds migration 
as a primary adaptation mechanism These characteristics have the potential to alter existing 
migration patterns in South Asia and incentivize abandoning a vulnerable place or region to 
climate change impacts. In turn, this may have long-lasting impacts on social and cultural 
identity and may imply that some regions or areas of the world are not worth saving simply 
because of anthropogenic climate change impacts caused primarily by industrialized nations with 
the resources to mitigate adverse effects.  
However, although the discourse itself may not be completely representative of the 
situation in South Asia, some level of climate change-induced migration in the region will still 
occur and must be accounted for through legal protection. Development and climate change 
migration are closely related; thus, a framework surrounding climate change migration should 
also include development strategies concerning adaptation and mitigation.  
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Next Steps 
5.1 Brief Summary of Arguments  
In this chapter, I will outline on my major arguments as well as reflect on general 
perceptions of the topic. The research question of this thesis is how has the ‘climate change 
refugee’ discourse been articulated and adopted in international and regional spheres, and how 
applicable are its representation of migrants and offered solutions in the South Asian region? 
Overall, the thesis engaged a wide range of academic and media evidence to demonstrate the 
inconsistencies between the theoretical or abstract ‘climate change refugee’ argument and the 
reality of migration and environmental degradation in the South Asian region.  
Although environmental migration has been a common practice throughout human 
history, climate change-induced displacement poses a unique challenge to this century. 
Environmental migration has been sparsely defined by a wide range of actors, including the UN 
and IOM, and definitions of ‘climate change refugee,’ are even more variable. Although specific 
countries like Sweden are beginning to recognize a type of climate change or environmental 
refugee, a unified definition of ‘climate change refugee’ and international framework regarding 
their protection is yet to be defined. Thus, much of the literature on ‘climate change refugees’ 
has not been practically applied to broad regions of the world.  
The current ‘climate change refugee’ discourse arose in response to a lack of protections 
for migrants fleeing unstable environments specifically due to climate change effects and 
escalating concerns about future impacts of climate change. Both humanitarian and human rights 
frameworks have been evoked to defend the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse, citing 
alleviating human suffering and global inequities leading to the cause of displacement as primary 
reasons to include international protections for ‘climate change refugees.’ However, despite an 
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increasing literature surrounding the discourse and the widely cited increasingly severe negative 
impacts of climate change, an international consensus on climate change migration or the 
international protection of ‘climate change refugees’ is yet to be developed. The lack of global 
diplomatic consensus and action regarding climate change and climate change migration is 
concerning despite the abundance of literature linking the two and arguing its inclusion. Within 
South Asia, the lack of such diplomatic action is linked to the absence of both climate change 
and migration within specific country agendas as well as among regional and national priorities, 
where economic development and cooperation take precedence. Escalating political tensions 
between and within countries in the region further distance climate change and climate change 
migration from domestic and regional frameworks.  
Climate change impacts have been widespread and variable within South Asia. These 
impacts intersect with local realities in complex ways to complicate migration patterns. Thus, 
within the South Asia, it is difficult to solely attribute any type of migration to any particular 
reason. Even in the extremely climate vulnerable nation of the Maldives, there are diverse 
perspectives concerning climate change migration and the use of the term, ‘climate change 
refugees’ remains contested.  
Overall, the thesis demonstrates that the discourse and solutions offered by the ‘climate 
change refugee’ regime are neither representative of nor applicable to South Asian migrants. The 
discourse does little to address mitigating climate change impacts and developing climate 
vulnerable areas. Instead, it works to disempower and remove agency from those living in 
vulnerable places by presenting them with no options, and quasi-forcing them from their long-
established homes and livelihoods. 
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5.2 Developing a nuanced “climate change refugee” discourse  
As stated before, climate change is a global phenomenon with widespread effects over 
diverse populations. While I affirm the validity of climate change effects and demonstrate how 
they impact migration patterns, I argue the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse does not offer 
practical solutions. While the humanitarian and human rights-based defense of ‘climate change 
refugees’ claim legitimacy, both rely on an idealist interpretation of humanitarian action and the 
standardization and absoluteness of human rights. In short, they do not acknowledge the existing 
nuance within humanitarian and human rights spheres. Additionally, the discourse attempts to 
garner impetus and urgency to address climate change issues by linking climate change to the 
production of refugees; however, the inadequacy of the solutions offered demonstrates the need 
for changes in how migrants are represented and treated under such a discourse.  
The exaggerated images of mass displacements of individuals permanently fleeing from 
climate vulnerable areas are neither accurate nor practical; they remove the context from which 
migration occurs, erase resilience and adaptation strategies undertaken by vulnerable 
communities, and assume well-established individuals and communities will abandon their lands 
and way of life. Additionally, these drastic images work to create fear among countries and 
regions that host those fleeing environmental disaster. This contributes to negative views and 
narratives of migrants and has significant impacts on how native and migrant populations 
interact. The presentation of migrants within the discourse must be re-framed so instead of the 
displaced being seen as a potential future security risk or burden, they are seen as individuals 
with agency who have utilized a wide range of adaptive strategies. Finally, the discourse should 
not work to disenfranchise or abandon those who wish to remain in climate vulnerable regions 
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by incentivizing migration. Those who remain must be afforded protections against climate 
change effects if scientifically possible. 
Thus, policymakers and humanitarians must consider if even presenting such migrants as 
completely devoid of options is appropriate. Views of climate migration should be adapted to fit 
within a broader context, where migration can be temporary or permanent, and local, regional or 
international in nature. The recent use of temporary visas in Australia, in which displacement is 
acknowledged and protected for a duration appropriate for a specific migrant, may prove fruitful 
for such climate migrants (Asylum Seeker Resource Center 2013). Finally, climate change itself 
must become normalized in the international sphere to avoid the problem of creating an alarmist 
discourse. Climate change adaptation and mitigation must be interwoven with broader 
frameworks of migration and development to counteract such dystopian narratives of future 
possibilities.  
To address the issue of climate migration, a discourse must be developed that also 
acknowledges the multiple perspectives and priorities of different actors in climate change 
migration situations to decrease the burden of negative unintended consequences of introducing 
this new class of migrant into international and regional spheres. Thus, characterizations of 
climate migrants must work with local communities threatened by climate change, instead of 
imposing external perspectives and narratives on how individuals are affected and respond to 
climate change consequences. Many of these communities have lived and adapted to 
environmental disaster and have created various strategies for survival. While migration has 
often been a means of adaptation, it should not be thought of the only adaptation strategy for 
those in severe climate change situations. However, it must also be understood that in the most 
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extreme situations, adaptation other than migration may not be possible, and in these most severe 
circumstances, protections to migrants must be afforded.   
Finally, the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse must not ignore the broader context in 
which migration occurs. Currently, the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse solely emphasizes 
protection for migrants displaced by a broad range of climate change consequences. This vague 
definition must be adapted for specific local and regional contexts, in which climate change 
consequences and migration decisions may vary considerably depending on a multitude of 
social, economic and political factors. For example, specific climate change impacts do not yield 
the same migration decisions across similar populations, indicating that socio-economic status or 
ability to cope with environmental disaster may impact migration decisions. As stated before, 
climate change and development are intrinsically linked; therefore, the ‘climate change refugee’ 
discourse must address how development impacts climate change consequences and migration 
decisions.  
Specifically, for South Asia, a region where climate change consequences are markedly 
increasing, developing an effective and representative ‘climate change refugee’ or climate 
change migration discourse is necessary. Given the lack of international consensus around 
climate migration, until the international community arrives at specific categories and definitions 
regarding climate migration, protection of those displaced by climate change as well as their 
environments lie in the hands of the South Asian countries themselves. 
In such a framework, South Asian countries will be responsible for acknowledging and 
protecting those who are fleeing or displaced by climate change induced environmental 
degradation as climate migrants, and those who continue to live in climate vulnerable conditions. 
The dearth of international consensus regarding climate change migration may allow South Asia 
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to develop a strong climate change migration paradigm specific to its unique context and better 
designed to meet needs of South Asian migrants. As South Asian countries have not signed 
international conventions regarding forced migration or refugees, this indicates that traditional 
notions of what constitutes a refugee may not be adequate for the South Asian region. In this 
sense, South Asian countries must define or outline regional conceptions of what constitutes a 
forced migration or refugee. The region may benefit from viewing such climate migrants as 
‘adaptation-mitigation migrants’ whose temporary migration may work to diminish severe 
climate change impacts. Overall, developing a robust regional framework regarding climate 
vulnerability and temporary resettlement should become a priority for regional policymakers.  
5.3 Next Steps: Who is responsible for climate change effects and how?  
Overall, the international lack of responsibility and action for climate change 
consequences stands in stark contrast with increasing attention paid to climate change migration 
and the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse. Climate change migration is due to climate change 
consequences and the ‘climate change refugee’ discourse is built on the assumption that the 
international political and economic community will acknowledge and take responsibility for the 
impacts of climate change, whether that is through protection of affected migrants or by 
mitigating the climate change causes. However, important global players, like the United States 
of America (US) under President Trump, have recently questioned the validity of climate 
change, cut funding toward climate change mitigation strategies and are considering leaving 
important international climate change conferences and conventions, like the Paris Conference 
(Davenport and Rubin 2017). The US’ departure from these important climate change policies 
and increasingly climate-denial stance has the potential to ripple throughout international and 
regional circles as the US is currently the world’s second largest contributor to global climate 
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change (GCC). Thus, in the immediate future, the question of who will take responsibility for 
and action against climate change impacts, including the displacement of people, will continue to 
be a problem.   
Equally important is the increasing nature of countries within South Asia of being 
contributors to GCC; currently, India is within the top ten contributors to GCC (Olivier et al. 
2015). Given this, South Asian regional and national frameworks regarding adaptation to and 
mitigation of climate change and its effects must become more defined. Regional cooperation 
will be key in addressing the widespread and transboundary impacts of climate change and 
environmental disaster. SAARC has already identified that regional adaptation to and mitigation 
of climate change will improve development indices and the quality of life in South Asia. In 
recent years, SAARC has not prioritized climate change or migration, instead focusing on 
economic development and promoting peace to diminish tensions between major SAARC 
nations. In April 2010, SAARC released a Statement on Climate Change through the Thimphu 
Declaration to follow up from the 2008 Dhaka Declaration (“Thimphu Statement on Climate 
Change” 2010). Both declarations recognize the importance of climate change and the challenge 
developing nations face in pursuing both socio-economic development and mitigating climate 
change. In general, South Asian countries are vocally against instituting stringent carbon or GHG 
emission caps, pointing to industrialization and economic development needs. However, despite 
global mitigation efforts through the Kyoto Protocol, ratified in 1992 in which 192 signatories 
vowed to decrease GHG and carbon emissions, and others like the Copenhagen conference, 
global GHG emissions still increase (Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report IPCC 2014).  
The global need to slow climate change and mitigate its causes points to a changing 
responsibility for South Asia and other developing countries. To confront this issue, 
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conceptualizations of who has accountability and responsibility for climate change effects and in 
what capacity must change. For example, Article 3.1 of United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) stresses common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change 
mitigation, which can be argued to mean that wealthier nations, instead of contributing more to 
resettlement or mitigation efforts, can invest money and resources into adaptation strategies in 
these more vulnerable countries (Gibb and Ford 2012) (“United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change” 1992). Additionally, climate activists like former Maldivian president 
Mohamed Nasheed point to a changing international paradigm in which economic development 
should not be dependent on carbon emissions (Sadat 2009). Recent scientific literature 
demonstrate that neither increased carbon emissions nor increased energy consumption leads to 
economic growth (Zhang and Cheng 2009). Thus, countries in South Asia and around the world 
should reevaluate their current policies toward climate change in order to create an agenda in 
which climate change prevention, mitigation and adaptation takes priority. In doing so, for future 
generations, such countries can prevent even more serious climate change impacts and create 
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